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As of February 24, 2022, as Russian air strikes, missiles, and tanks began pouring into an
outmatched Ukraine, the Byzantine calculus of symphonia, of a mutually interdependent
church and state, devolved into an unholy alliance joining at the hip a predatory Putin and
a sycophantic Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kyrill.
Especially over the past decade Patriarch Kyrill has tied the fate of his church to that of
his patron Putin, the same tragic mistake made by the same church in its defense of tsarist
Russia in its death throes.
Since his accession in 2009, and emphatically since Russia’s moves against Crimea,
Donetsk, and Luhansk in 2014, Patriarch Kyrill has sought to enshrine the principle of
“Russky mir,” the “Russian World,” which he understands to mean the spiritual and
ecclesial union of the Eastern Slavs.
Following the demise of Marxism, Russian Orthodoxy emerged as a substitute state
ideology, not only giving the Russian Republic a sacred purpose for its existence, but also
energizing the dream of the reconstitution of the old Russian/Soviet empire.
Presuming an East-West spiritual and moral divide, Putin increasingly sees all things
Western, including Catholicism and Protestantism on Russian soil, as a threat to Russian
Orthodoxy, which is one of the underpinnings of his regime.
In close proximity to notions of the “Russian World” and Orthodox triumphalism is the
attendant messianic belief that Patriarch Kyrill and Putin are the world’s last best hope
for the preservation of traditional Christian family values, and this in the face of their
obscenely lavish lifestyles and out-sized hubris.
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Tragically, the Russian Orthodox Church, far from being a check on Putin’s war against
Chechnya, anti-Assad forces in Syria, and now Ukraine, supports the Russian autocrat
wholeheartedly.
On March 6, 2022, Orthodoxy’s Forgiveness Sunday, in Moscow’s palatial Cathedral of
Christ the Savior, Patriarch Kyrill outdid himself going so far as to equate Ukraine with
the Prodigal Son.
On February 28, 2022, Kyrill declared in vain that a guarantee of “fraternal relations”
would be “our united Orthodox Church represented in Ukraine by the Ukrainian Orthodox
Church headed by His Beatitude Onuphry.” Yet four days prior, on the very day the
Russian invasion began, Metropolitan Onuphry had already boldly condemned Russian
aggression. For the head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in communion with Moscow
a Russian war against Ukrainians is “a repetition of the sin of Cain, who killed his own
brother out of envy.”
On March 2, 2022, this author received an “Appeal to Compatriots” signed by 81 (at the
latest count, 380) individuals, mostly Russian Evangelical Christians-Baptists and some
Pentecostals, condemning the Russian attack on Ukraine in the strongest of terms: “We
assess what is happening as a grave sin of fratricide—the sin of Cain, who raised his hand
against his brother Abel,” the identical biblical condemnation Ukrainian Orthodox
Metropolitan Onufry had laid at the feet of Putin.
As of March 6, nearly 300 Russian Orthodox priests had signed a petition of their own in
opposition to the war in Ukraine. Like Ukrainian Metropolitan Onufry and Russian
Protestants in their Appeal, the petition of these exceptionally brave Russian Orthodox
priests—but no Russian metropolitans—references Cain’s murder of his brother Abel.
Among those who signed the Evangelical Appeal are dear friends I have known for decades
for whom I now have reason to fear. They will suffer for this unless Putin is dethroned.
There is also good reason to fear for the safety of any believer of any persuasion other than
Russian Orthodox in any additional Ukrainian territory occupied by Russian forces.
Manifestations of a reign of terror in Ukrainian lands occupied by Russia or its minions in
2014 are numerous and sobering: press slander, fines, harassment, deportations, raids on
worship services, robberies, forced closures of church-based orphanages, rehabilitation
centers, charities, and seminaries, interrogations utilizing psychological and physical
torture, and murder.
Russian Republic violations of freedom of conscience pale before the draconian theocratic
regimes now in place in Crimea and the Donbas. Unfortunately, the experience of Crimea,
Donetsk, and Luhansk is very likely what is in store for believers not beholden to Kyrill in
any additional lands Russian forces wrest from Ukraine.
At present Putin, with Kyrill in tow, is about the destruction of a democratic, religiously
tolerant state that is home to arguably the most robust Christian population of any country
in Europe. Ukraine, with a population of 44 million, is home to more Orthodox churches
than Russia with a population more than three times that of Ukraine (146 million). And the
same is true for other Christian confessions and denominations. Despite its smaller size,
Ukraine is home to far more energetic and growing populations of Catholics, Baptists,
Pentecostals, and Adventists than is Russia.
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Two words in Old Church Slavonic, three words in English, are voiced repeatedly in the
Orthodox Divine Liturgy: Gospodi pomilui, Lord have mercy. As Ukraine appears on the
brink of descent into another Golgotha of Russian captivity, and as Russia, Eastern
Europe, and the West all appear to be entering into a time fraught with the greatest danger
to world peace since World War II, we cannot repeat too often, Lord have mercy.
As of February 24, 2022, as Russian air strikes, missiles, and tanks began pouring into an

outmatched Ukraine, the Byzantine calculus of symphonia, of a mutually interdependent church
and state, devolved into an unholy alliance joining at the hip a predatory Putin and a sycophantic
Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kyrill. The backdrop of recent decades saw Ukraine by fits and starts
increasingly favoring the European over the Russian orbit. That has driven to distraction a Kremlin
kleptocrat and a politically motivated prelate fearful of the prospect of the loss of power and wealth
that that shift entails.
Especially over the past decade Patriarch Kyrill has tied the fate of his church to that of his
patron Putin, the same tragic mistake made by the same church in its defense of tsarist Russia in
its death throes. Back on February 12, 2012, female punk rockers momentarily coopted the sacred
space of Moscow’s mammoth Cathedral of Christ the Savior, protesting in song Putin’s repressive
regime and the Moscow Patriarchate’s collusion with it. Sadly, Kyrill defended the harsh two-year
sentences meted out to three women in August 2012, ushering in the precise opposite of what the
punk rockers intended—an intensified, retrograde collaboration of church and state, not reflective
of the ideal of symphonia, but rather reflective of ancient caesaropapism, the subordination of
church to state. The Orthodox Church’s ready acceptance of a heavy-handed court punishment of
young female dissidents seemed to confirm the growing defensiveness of church and state,
drawing Russia’s patriarch and president into an ever-tighter embrace.1
Putin’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine is his second act of military aggression against, as he sees
it, a wayward “Little Russian” child. Large scale public protests in 2011-12 against Putin’s suspect
reelection victory and the 2012 toppling of tyrants in Middle East color revolutions, unnerved
Putin. No doubt it also re-enforced his opposition to Kyiv’s 2013-14 Maidan Revolution, which
saw the ouster of pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovich. Putin alleges these developments

Mark R. Elliott, “The Impact of the Ukrainian Crisis on Religious Life in Ukraine and Russia,” East-West Church
and Ministry Report 22 (Summer 2014), 8; Eliot Borenstein, “The Cathedral of Christ the Savior as Scandal and
Haunted House,” East-West Church and Ministry Report 22 (Spring 2014), 7-8. Lawrence Uzzell, “Punk Rockers in
the Cathedral: Another View,” East-West Church and Ministry Report 23 (Winter 2015): 16, 15.
1
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were Western-inspired. In response he moved militarily in 2014 against Ukraine, annexing Crimea,
fomenting successful revolts by pro-Russian separatists in portions of Donetsk and Luhansk in
eastern Ukraine, and attempting—unsuccessfully—pro-Russian takeovers in Kharkiv, Odesa, and
other Ukrainian cities.
As a result, Patriarch Kyrill found himself in a painfully awkward position. Could he
simultaneously support Kremlin aggression in Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk without so
alienating the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate that the latter would choose to
sever its ties with Russian Orthodoxy? Alexei Malashenko, religion specialist at the Carnegie
Moscow Center, laid out the Russian Orthodox predicament: “gradually losing Ukraine if it just
goes on repeating word for word the Kremlin line, it risks becoming only a national church of
Russia. If Kirill loses out in Ukraine, he also becomes less attractive for the Kremlin.2
How did Kyrill attempt to simultaneously satisfy Putin and his coreligionists in Ukraine?
Rendering unto Caesar, in Kyiv back in 2010 he had blessed Ukraine’s pro-Russian President
Yanukovich. Later, on March 19, 2014, in a session of the Russian Orthodox Holy Synod, with
Russian forces in full control of Crimea, Kyrill fudged that an “internal political crisis” was what
was threatening Ukraine’s territorial integrity.3 The next month, on April 7, 2014, he likened the
Maidan Revolution to the violence of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 which “was accompanied
by outrage and terrible injustice under slogans for achieving justice.”4 Twelve days later on Easter
eve, in a service in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior, with President Putin and Prime Minister
Medvedev in attendance, Kyrill declared that God should put “an end to the designs of those who
want to destroy holy Russia.” Ukraine, he said, stood in need of officials who are “legitimately
elected,” parroting the Kremlin position that Kyiv’s post-Madan government lacked legitimacy.5
At the same time, Patriarch Kyrill sought to minimize tensions with the pro-Maidan
Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) for fear of losing its loyalty. On
March 18, 2014, he chose not to attend the signing ceremony incorporating Crimea into the
Russian Federation.6 And the next day in a meeting of the Holy Synod he declined to transfer UOC

Elliott, “Impact,” 8.
Gabriela Bacznska, “Russian Orthodox Church Sings from Putin Hymn Sheet on Ukraine,” Reuters, March 7, 2014.
4
“Patrarch Kyrill Compares Events in Ukraine to 1917 Revolution,” Interfax, April 7, 2014.
5
Elliott, “Impact,” 8.
6
Vladislav Maltsev, “Brother Slavs and Mother Church; Conflict of Russia and Ukraine Places Moscow Patriarchate
at Brink of Schism,” NG-Religiia, March 5, 2014; William Yoder, “Weeping with Those Who Weep; Hot and Cold
Showers in Ukraine and Russia,” press release, April 21, 2014; rea-Moskva.org.
2
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MP parishes in Crimea to the Russian Orthodox Church. On the one hand, Kyrill claimed “The
Ukrainian people must determine its own future by itself, without outside interference.” On the
other hand, “The brotherhood of the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian peoples” should
“determine our future.”7 The patriarch’s tightrope performance involved juggling the appearance
of respect for Ukrainian sovereignty while championing a concept that frightened many
Ukrainians—the idea that Russian-Ukrainian spiritual and political union is indivisible.
Since his accession in 2009, and emphatically since March 2014, Patriarch Kyrill has
sought to enshrine the principle of “Russky mir,” the “Russian World,” which he understands to
mean the spiritual and ecclesial union of the Eastern Slavs.8 “Whatever development that political
[Russian-Ukrainian] confrontation takes, the unity in faith and brotherhood of people baptized in
one and the same baptismal font cannot be deleted from their past.”9
The fact is that Kyrill could not avoid contradictions in his awkward balancing act: Either
“the Church is above these differences and cannot identify itself with any particular point of view”
or “We know that every time that enemies have attacked our fatherland, the chief thing that they
have wanted to do is divide our people, and especially to rip the southern and western Russian
[sic] lands from the single world.” In the end, for Kyrill, Ukraine’s sovereignty and its “wish to
build independently its own national life” was to be trumped by a cherished ‘common spiritual
space,” that is, “the brotherhood of the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarussian nations…hard won by
history and many generations of our ancestors.”10 Kyrill seemed to hopelessly intertwined spiritual
and political considerations and caromed erratically between Great Russian patriotism and
conciliatory gestures toward Ukrainian Orthodox whose fealty he hoped to retain.11
Not only Kyrill, but Putin and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov subscribe to the
notion of the Russian World, a geopolitical concoction that conflates Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus
into a single entity in which “Great Russians” are said to have played and, henceforth forevermore,
are to play the leading secular and spiritual role in Eurasia. Here was a latter-day iteration of might
makes right, descended from the tsarist imperial mantra of “Moscow the Third Rome.” The story

Maltsev, “Brother Slavs.”
Sophia Kishkovsky, “Ukrainian Crisis May Split Russian Orthodox Church,” Religion News Service, March 14,
2014.
9
“Statement of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church,” March 20, 2014;
http://risu.org.ua/en/index/all_news/orthox/Moscow_patiarchy/55802.
10
“Partiarch Kirill: Ukraine’s Sovereignty Should Not Destroy Russian World,” Religiia v Ukraine, March 14, 2014.
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Maltsev, “Brother Slavs.”
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goes: the fall of ancient Rome was followed by the emergence of a second Rome, Constantinople,
which in turn fell prey to the Ottoman Turks. In its stead arose Moscow, the Third Rome, destined
to be the ultimate, forever protector of Christendom.
Following the demise of Marxism, Russian Orthodoxy emerged as a substitute state
ideology, not only giving the Russian Republic a sacred purpose for its existence, but also
energizing the dream of the reconstitution of the old Russian/Soviet empire. Thus, in the words of
political commentator Paul Goble, “What is going on in Ukraine is not just a political struggle
between those in Ukraine who want to become part of Europe and those who oppose such a step
by preferring to link their fates with Moscow. Rather, the [Russian] imperialist defenders…argue
that the Ukrainian crisis represents a clash of civilizations between Western Christianity and
Russian-led Eastern Christianity.”12 Consequently, the concept of the “Russian World” presumes
and expects there to be civilizational and spiritual components to conflict between Orthodoxy,
meaning correct worship, and Western Christianity, Catholic and Protestant, both considered
schismatic.
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov contends the successful 2014 Maidan Revolution and
Ukraine’s pivot to the West were the handiwork of the U.S. and Europe, which recruited Ukraine
to oppose Russia’s return to its “traditional spiritual values.” In an address to the Russian World
Affairs Council in Moscow, Lavrov complained that the West “attempts to impose Western values
on everyone,” which he contended are “evermore detached from their own Christians roots.”13
Also presuming an East-West spiritual and moral divide, Putin increasingly sees all things
Western, including Catholicism and Protestantism on Russian soil, as a threat to Russian
Orthodoxy, which is one of the underpinnings of his regime. Representative of this mindset is
Archpriest Andrey Novikov, an anti-Maidan cleric who relocated from Odesa to Moscow in 2014:
“Russia has always been spiritually opposed to the West, repulsing Catholic and Protestant
expansion. Now, Russia is opposing the complete destruction of Christian morality.”
Political commentator Goble rightly concludes that “such statements tap into some of the deepest
levels of Russian paranoia” and “make it even more difficult for the country to escape from its

Paul Goble, “Moscow Seeing the Ukraine Conflict as a Spiritual Struggle,” East-West Church and Ministry Report
22 (Fall 2014), 5.
13
Goble, “Moscow,” 5.
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current wave of obscurantism and oppression of all faiths except the favored Russian Orthodox
Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.”14
In close proximity to notions of the “Russian World” and Orthodox triumphalism is the
attendant messianic belief that Patriarch Kyrill and Putin are the world’s last best hope for the
preservation of traditional Christian family values, and this in the face of their obscenely lavish
lifestyles and out-sized hubris. Particularly astounding is the fact that a former KGB agent who
has succeeded in destroying every check on his power, who to that end has been responsible for
the death of untold numbers of Russians, Georgians, Syrians, and now Ukrainians, and who has
robbed state resources wholesale to the tune of billions in offshore accounts, is touted as the
preserver of traditional Christian values, not only by the Russian Orthodox Church but by too
many conservative commentators and Christians even in the United States.15
Tragically, the Russian Orthodox Church, far from being a check on Putin’s war against
Chechnya, anti-Assad forces in Syria, and now Ukraine, supports the Russian autocrat
wholeheartedly. And in the bargain its priests even bless with holy water military hardware,
including nuclear missiles.16 On Thursday, February 24, 2022, the day of the launch of the Russian
invasion of Ukraine, Patriarch Kyrill declined to call it such, in keeping with the Kremlin
propaganda line, instead tepidly referencing a crisis in “current events” in which casualties on both
sides were to be minimized.17
By way of contrast, Russia’s Catholic bishops, ever vulnerable to charges of disloyalty to
Mother Russia and complicity with the West, nevertheless immediately on the day of the invasion
risked giving offense to the Kremlin by forthrightly calling for hostilities to cease and laying
blame: “Let our contemporaries know that they will have to give strict account of the military
actions they have taken…. And we also appeal to all people, especially fellow Christians, to resist
lies and hatred.”18
Tacking a different course from Russia’s Catholic prelates, Kyrill, in his Sunday homily,
February 27, dropped any pretense of neutrality in a war pitting Orthodox against Orthodox,
Goble, “Moscow,” 5.
Anthea Butler, “Why White Evangelicals Are Putin’s Biggest American Fan Base,” MSNBC, March 1, 2022.
16
Dmitry Adamsky, Russian Nuclear Orthodoxy: Religion, Politics, and Strategy (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 2019).
17
George E. Demacopoulos, “The Orthodox Response to Putin’s Invasion; From Complacency to Clear
Condemnation,” Commonweal, February 27, 2022.
18
“Russia; Address of the Conference of Catholic Bishops of Russia about the War in Ukraine,” Human Rights Without
Frontiers, March 7, 2022.
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15

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (MARCH 2022) XLII, 2

36

declaring, “God forbid that…the evil forces that have always striven against the unity of Rus’ and
the Russian Church gain the upper hand.” And what territory does the Patriarch’s plea for prayer
for “Russian land” encompass? He meant by it the lands “Russia and Ukraine and Belarus.”19 Most
recently, on March 6, Orthodoxy’s Forgiveness Sunday, in Moscow’s palatial Cathedral of Christ
the Savior, Patriarch Kyrill outdid himself in defense of Putin and Russia’s war to save Ukraine
from alleged Nazism and Western decadence. The Patriarch went so far as to equate Ukraine with
the Prodigal Son. Might the head of the Russian Orthodox Church better request forgiveness for
defending a war that is taking the lives of untold, innocent civilians?20
Ukrainian Orthodox Deacon Tim Kelleher reacted negatively to Kyrill’s “fervent prayer
for the earliest restoration of peace.” He writes, “The earliest restoration of peace would be the
instant Vladimir Putin says, Stop! The patriarch has his president’s phone number. He should call
it.” Otherwise, Kyrill “is on the brink of turning…into the accomplice of a war criminal.” Kelleher
continues, “President and prelate are working from the same book [but] it’s not a prayer book.”21
March 7 another Orthodox cleric, but this one Russian far from the safety of a Western address,
dared pray on the internet:
Help Ukrainians who defend themselves and others to stand.
Help Ukrainians who are weak and powerless to take refuge in safe countries, to survive in
bomb shelters and basements.
Help Ukrainians in the midst of shelling and fires to keep hope for life, for truth, for victory.
Help humanity to help Ukrainians, and last, please help me, too, not to go crazy, not to seek
comfort in hatred, but to seek comfort in You, Heavenly Father, in Your Son the Lord Jesus
Christ in the Holy Spirit.
American Greek Orthodox deacon and scholar George Demacopoulus has explored his
confession’s mixed responses to the Russian war against Ukraine to date.
1. Orthodox laity, within and without Russia, are united “in a sense of shared horror and
concern,” while responses of bishops have been mixed.

“Patriarch Kyrill Urges to Pray for Peace in ‘Russian Lands,’” Interfax Religion, February 28, 2022; www.interfaxreligion.com/?act=news&div=16449.
20
Tenzin Zompa, “In Sunday Sermon, Orthodox Bishop [sic] Kirill Backs Russia’s War Against Ukraine,” The
Print.in;
https://theprint.in/world/in-sunday-sermon-orthodox-bishop-kirill-backs-russias-war-againstukraine/862058.
21
Tim Kelleher, “The Scandalous Silence of Moscow’s Patriarch,” National Reviews, March 3, 2022.
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2. Hierarchs adamant in opposition to Russia’s war against Ukraine are Ecumenical
Patriarch Bartholomew and Archbishop Ieronymos of Athens.
3. The Romanian Orthodox Church has called the invasion of Ukraine a war against a
sovereign state, while Metropolitan Tikhon of the Orthodox Church in America has
declared Putin the instigator of the conflict and has called on him to cease and desist.
4. The Orthodox Church of Finland declared that it “strongly condemns the military
actions of the Russian Federation in Ukraine,” stating as well that “There is no
justification for war.”
5. In contrast, the autocephalous Orthodox Churches of Bulgaria, Serbia, and Jerusalem
have declined to take sides.
6. Metropolitan Hilarion of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia in New York
(not to be confused with the metropolitan of the same name in Moscow) has referred
to conflict in “‘Ukrainian land’ (a deliberate slight that denies Ukraine’s sovereignty),”
but has avoided use of the word war. This, Demacopoulis suggests, “indicates the
extent to which many of the leaders of the Russian Church (whether inside or outside
of Russia) have been infected by Putin’s nationalistic propaganda.”
Demacopoulus concludes that global Orthodox opposition to Russia’s war on Ukraine may
grow, “especially if the violence continues for a prolonged period. It is also possible that a drawnout war will hasten the move of Orthodox in Ukraine away from the Moscow Patriarchate and into
the new autocephalous Orthodox Church of Ukraine.”22
The latter is already the case. On February 25 the Lviv Diocese of the Ukrainian Orthodox
Church Moscow Patriarchate declared for the non-commemoration of the prayer for Kyrill in the
Divine Liturgy. Likewise, as of March 1, the Sumy Diocese of the same church, adjacent to the
Russian border and subjected to Russian shelling from the start of the invasion, was omitting from
the Divine Liturgy the customary prayer for the Russian Patriarch. 23 On February 28, Kyrill
declared in vain that a guarantee of “fraternal relations” would be “our united Orthodox Church

Demacopoulos, “The Orthodox Response.”
“Movement of Noncommemoration of Patriarch Kirill Has Begun in U.P.Ts.M.P. Dioceses,” Religious Information
Service of Ukraine, March 1, 2022; “Patriarch Kyrill Calls Reluctance of Some Ukrainian Priests to Commemorate
Him in Prayers for Political Reasons Sin,” Interfax-Religion, March 3, 2022; “Lvov Diocese of U.P.Ts.M.P. Requests
Calling of Bishops’ Council for Declaring Independence of Church from Moscow,” Religious Information Service of
Ukraine, March 4, 2022.
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represented in Ukraine by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church headed by His Beatitude Onuphry.”24
Yet four days prior, on the very day the Russian invasion began, Metropolitan Onuphry had already
boldly condemned Russian aggression and called on Putin to “immediately stop the fratricidal
war.” Italian sociologist of religion Massimo Introvigne correctly sees this as
something surprising. Very surprising indeed. It is the fact that the Ukrainian Orthodox
Church of the Moscow Patriarchate, i.e., according to Putin, the very Church that Russian
troops went to defend in Ukraine against the ‘persecution’ of the majority Orthodox Church
and the government, not only did not support the invasion but took a very tough stance
against…. Note that this is a church including a majority of Russian-speaking Ukrainians,
giving the lie to the theory that Russian-speaking Ukrainians support the invasion.25
Metropolitan Onufry further declared that his flock was to extend its “special love and
support to our [Ukrainian] soldiers who stand guard and protect and defend our land and our
people. May God bless and guard them!” For the head of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in
communion with Moscow a Russian war against Ukrainians is “a repetition of the sin of Cain, who
killed his own brother out of envy. Such a war has no justification.”26
On March 2, this author received an “Appeal to Compatriots” signed by 81 (at the latest
count, 380) individuals, mostly Russian Evangelical Christians-Baptists and some Pentecostals
and other Protestants, condemning the Russian attack on Ukraine in the strongest of terms: “Our
army is…dropping bombs and rockets on the cities of our neighboring Ukraine. As believers, we
assess what is happening as a grave sin of fratricide—the sin of Cain, who raised his hand against
his brother Abel,” the identical biblical condemnation Ukrainian Orthodox Metropolitan Onufry
had laid at the feet of Putin. The startlingly bold Russian Evangelical Appeal went on to declare,
“While we still have a chance to avoid punishment from above and prevent the collapse of our
country, we need to repent for what we have done, first of all before God, and then before the
people of Ukraine. We must give up the lies and hatred. We call on the authorities of our country
to stop this senseless bloodshed!”27
As of March 6, nearly 300 Russian Orthodox priests had signed a petition of their own in
opposition to the war in Ukraine and the arrest of Russians protesting the invasion. Like Ukrainian
Massimo Introvigne, “Orthodox United Against Putin,” Human Rights Without Frontiers, March 2, 2022;
https://bit/ly/3K3ye02.
25
Introvigne, “Orthodox United.”
26
Demacopoulos, “The Orthodox Response.”
27
https://docs.google.com/forms/d/1aNpjzui3uMeOWepUhWzgg0WEjPQrE8A2AMQNl8dZAAs/viewform?edit_re
quested=true.
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Metropolitan Onufry and Russian Protestants, in their Appeal, the petition of these exceptionally
brave Russian Orthodox priests—but no Russian metropolitans—references Cain’s murder of his
brother Abel, quoting Genesis 4: 10, “The voice of your brother’s blood cries out to Me from the
ground; and now you are cursed from the earth.” Imagine the courage that attends priests who dare
to, in essence, call out Putin as accursed for leading Russia into the present war. This is out of
character in Russian Orthodox history and greatly to be praised.28
Among those who signed the Evangelical Appeal are dear friends I have known for decades
for whom I now have reason to fear. Upon receipt of the Appeal, I immediately wrote Christianity
Today, which had first forwarded the appeal to me, “This is an extraordinarily courageous step
compared to evangelical timidity previously under Putin. Upon recent of the “Appeal” I am
amazed and heartened that these brave people are defending Ukraine. They will suffer for this
unless Putin is dethroned. Lord have mercy.”
There is also good reason to fear for the safety of any believer of any persuasion other than
Russian Orthodox in any additional Ukrainian territory occupied by Russian forces. For those who
may think such a prediction is an exaggeration, consider conditions since 2014 in Crimea and in
Russian separatist-held territories in Luhansk and Donetsk. Overwhelming evidence documents
Russian religious repression of non-Moscow Patriarchate believers in these regions surpassing
anything being endured in Russia proper by people of faith who are not beholden to Patriarch
Kyrill. The findings of Russian Academy of Sciences religion specialist Roman Lunkin, who
traveled to Crimea in 2015, support this claim. There Muslims have faced sharp discrimination by
being blocked from required state reregistration.29 Many non-Moscow Patriarchate Orthodox in
the peninsula have seen their churches closed or have seen them forcibly transferred to the Russian
Orthodox Church. Many, as well, have fled, while authorities have also deported uncooperative
Evangelical and Muslim clergy.30 Academician Lunkin continues:
Methods of discrimination against religious minorities include invalidating leases
for quarters for worship, preventing the purchase of land for new churches, and making
official registration cumbersome or impossible.
The consequences of Crimea joining Russia were the most tragic for the peninsula’s
Pentecostals and Baptists. Hundreds of their churches and thousands of their believers have
suffered discrimination in the transition.
Elise Ann Allen, “Russian Orthodox Priests Call for Immediate End to War in Ukraine,” Crux, March 6, 2022.
Roman Lunkin, “Religious Politics in Crimea, 2014-2016,” East-West Church and Ministry Report 25 (Spring
2017), 10.
30
Lunkin, “Religious Politics,” East-West Church and Ministry Report 25 (Winter 2017), 1.
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In an atmosphere of Russian xenophobia and patriotism…all Protestant churches
(together with Catholics, Greek Catholics, and the UOC KP) are seen as symbols of
Western influence, which has led to persecution and suspicion for these churches. Some of
these church communities have been destroyed while others have survived, but with their
influence and strength noticeably weakened.31
As early as 2016 Russian rule in Crimea witnessed a fifty percent reduction in “functioning
religious associations,” with favored Moscow Patriarchate Orthodox churches representing the
vast majority of still-functioning parishes.32 A recent study found that Crimean courts in 2021
found 22 individuals guilty and fined for violations of Russia’s “anti-missionary” laws.33
Conditions endured by disfavored believers have been mild in Crimea and Russia proper
compared to Russian separatist Donetsk and Luhansk “People’s Republics” where as late as midFebruary 2022 Russian Republic authorities maintained a low profile. With no authority from
Moscow reining in local separatist hot heads and owing to a lack of any international monitoring
of human rights, violence and wholesale discrimination against religious minorities have been the
norm.34 Innumerable flagrant infringements upon freedom of conscience have been perpetrated by
a “Russian Orthodox Army” and a “Cossack Army.” “Evidence has come to light,” one Ukrainian
human rights study notes, “that several priests of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow
Patriarchate have, to varying degree, supported these unlawful paramilitary groups in their
campaign against representatives of Protestant, Evangelical and Catholic Churches and Orthodox
believers who do not recognize the Moscow Patriarchate.”35
Manifestations of a reign of terror in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine are numerous
and sobering: press slander, fines, harassment, deportations, raids on worship services, robberies,
forced closures of church-based orphanages, rehabilitation centers, charities, and seminaries,
interrogations utilizing psychological and physical torture, and murder.36 Not a single church other
than Russian Orthodox remains open in the Luhansk “People’s Republic” and precious few in the
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Donetsk “People’s Republic.”37 Kharkiv, though predominately Russian-speaking, has
nevertheless fiercely resisted its “liberation” by Russian troops, no doubt in part with nightmarish
separatist misrule in the neighboring Donbas in mind. Is it any wonder that some scholars have
likened separatist Donetsk and Luhansk to “Orthodox mini-theocracies?”38
For decades I have followed closely the ever-increasing restrictions imposed upon
believers in the Russian Republic who are not part of the Russian Orthodox Church Moscow
Patriarchate. Especially discriminatory religious legislation was passed by the Duma in 1997 and
2016.39 Still, Russian state violations of freedom of conscience pale before the draconian theocratic
regimes now in place in Crimea and the Donbas. Unfortunately, the experience of Crimea,
Donetsk, and Luhansk is very likely what is in store for believers not beholden to Kyrill in any
additional lands Russian forces wrest from Ukraine.
In response to the wholesale violations of freedom of conscience in Ukrainian territories
occupied by Russia and Russian separatists in 2014, the widespread targeting of civilian
populations in Russia’s present war in Ukraine, and the craven support for Putin’s war on Ukraine
by Russia’s religious leaders, one Western NGO now proposes sanctions against the Kremlin’s
coopted and complicit religious leaders. Willy Fautre, director of Brussels-based Human Rights
Without Frontiers, “recommends that the EU, the UK and the US put on their lists of
sanctions…religious revisionist leaders and entities endorsing the rhetoric of President Vladimir
Putin about the ‘non-war’ and the ‘non-invasion’ of Ukraine,” namely Patriarch Kyrill of the
Russian Orthodox Church; Russian Orthodox Metropolitan Dionisy of Voskresensk; the Spiritual
Council of the Russian United Union of Christians of Evangelical Faith (Pentecostals); Berl Lazar,
Chief Rabbi of Russia; Albir Krganov, Head of the Spiritual Assembly of Muslims of Russia;
Talgat Tajuddin, Head of the Central Spiritual Muslim Board of Russia; Ismail Berdiyev, Head of
the Coordinating Center of Muslims of North Caucasus; and Damba Ayusheyev, Head of the
Russian Buddhist Traditional Sangha.40
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At present Putin, with Kyrill in tow, is about the destruction of a democratic, religiously
tolerant state that is home to arguably the most robust Christian population of any country in
Europe. Ukraine, with a population of 44 million, is home to more Orthodox churches than Russia
with a population more than three times that of Ukraine (146 million). And the same is true for
other Christian confessions and denominations. Despite its smaller size, Ukraine is home to far
more energetic and growing populations of Catholics, Baptists, Pentecostals, and Adventists than
is Russia. In addition, Ukraine boasts one of the largest, if not the largest, number of missionaries
of any country in Europe, many, ironically, serving in Russia.41
Two words in Old Church Slavonic, three words in English, are voiced repeatedly in the
Orthodox Divine Liturgy: Gospodi pomilui, Lord have mercy. As Ukraine appears on the brink of
descent into another Golgotha of Russian captivity, and as Russia, Eastern Europe, and the West
all appear to be entering into a time fraught with the greatest danger to world peace since World
War II, we cannot repeat too often, Lord have mercy.
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